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OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
In this putative class action, the sole issue presented by
this appeal is whether a plaintiff must prove detrimental reliance
in order to recover actual damages sustained because of a
disclosure violation under § 1640(a)  of the Truth in Lending1
Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67.  The District Court,
following persuasive authority from our sister courts of appeals,
concluded that detrimental reliance was required, and granted
     The putative class allegedly includes tens of thousands of2
consumers who financed their purchases of motor vehicles with
loans from Sky Bank.
     TILA’s rules are implemented through Regulation Z, 123
C.F.R. Pt. 226, issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604.   Regulation Z
compels the creditor to disclose “[t]he items required by
§ 226.4(d) in order to exclude certain insurance premiums and
debt cancellation fees from the finance charge.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.18(n).  For voluntary debt cancellation fees, these
requirements are: “(A) The debt cancellation agreement or
coverage is not required, and this fact is disclosed in writing; (B)
The fee or premium for the initial term of coverage is
disclosed. . . . ; (C) The consumer signs or initials an affirmative
written request for coverage after receiving the disclosures . . . .”
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(3)(i).
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summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff failed to
plead and could not prove detrimental reliance.  We will affirm.
I.
Louis Vallies brought a putative class action on behalf of
consumers who had obtained loans from Sky Bank to finance
purchases of motor vehicles,  claiming Sky Bank violated TILA2
disclosure requirements, specifically 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d).   3
5Vallies and Sky Bank had entered into a Loan Note and
Security Agreement, which financed an automobile and other
items, including a premium of $395 for Guaranteed Auto
Protection (“GAP”), a form of debt cancellation insurance
covering any loan deficiency which may remain in the event
property insurance was insufficient to cover complete property
loss.  This charge was not calculated into the “finance charge”
as required by TILA.  In addition, instead of itemizing the GAP
premium individually, the loan agreement combined it with a
$1395 service contract charge, and disclosed the two generally
as $1790 to be paid to National Auto, the service contract seller.
At the same time, Vallies also signed the GAP Waiver
Agreement with the automobile dealer, Phil Fitts Ford, which
contained the statements required by TILA.  Sky Bank was not
a party to the GAP Waiver Agreement.
The District Court initially granted Sky Bank’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that Sky Bank did
not violate TILA because the necessary disclosures had been
made to Vallies—not by Sky Bank, but by the automobile dealer
Phil Fitts Ford, a third party.  Alternatively, the District Court
concluded that under TILA, each creditor is not required to
make all relevant disclosures.  We reversed and remanded,
holding that “the creditor, and the creditor alone, is required to
disclose . . . required information.”  Vallies v. Sky Bank, 432
F.3d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 2005).  On remand, Sky Bank moved for
summary judgment, asserting that it fulfilled its TILA
obligations through an undisclosed agent.  After the District
     The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.4
§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).  We have appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Court denied summary judgment, the parties settled Vallies’s
statutory damage claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) for the
maximum statutory amount of $501,000.  The District Court
certified a class exclusively for settlement purposes and
approved the settlement.
The settlement, however, explicitly did not cover
Vallies’s actual damage claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1).
Sky Bank moved for summary judgment on these claims,
arguing that Vallies cannot recover actual damages because he
failed to plead and cannot prove detrimental reliance.  The
District Court held that to recover actual damages, Vallies must
show “(1) he read the TILA disclosure statement; (2) he
understood the charges being disclosed; (3) had the disclosure
statement been accurate, he would have sought a lower price;
and (4) he would have obtained a lower price.”  Mem. Order at
10.  Finding that Vallies “got all of the required information and
voluntarily elected to incur the debt cancellation insurance when
he purchased his vehicle,” the District Court concluded he could
not satisfy the third or fourth element recited, and granted Sky
Bank’s motion for summary judgment.  Id.  Vallies now
appeals.4
     See United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 297 (6th5
Cir. 2009) (“[A]ctual damages require a showing of detrimental
reliance.”); McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc. (In re
Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no valid
basis to overturn the rule requiring a showing of detrimental
reliance to establish actual damages); Gold Country Lenders v.
Smith (In re Smith), 289 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We
join with other circuits and hold that in order to receive actual
damages for a TILA violation . . . a borrower must establish
detrimental reliance.”); Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d
1023, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“We hold that
detrimental reliance is an element of a TILA claim for actual
damages . . . .”); Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232
F.3d 433, 434–40 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that detrimental
reliance is an element of a claim for actual damages and
7
II.
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation,
and “[o]ur review of questions of statutory interpretation is
plenary.”  Direct TV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir.
2007).  Although we have not had an opportunity to examine
this issue, we have previously noted that “[s]everal courts have
held that detrimental reliance is an element of establishing actual
damages under TILA.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d
277, 302 n.20 (3d Cir. 2005).  In fact, every court of appeals that
has spoken on this issue has required a showing of detrimental
reliance.   Most district courts are in accord.   Even Vallies5 6
rejecting numerous arguments to the contrary); Stout v. J.D.
Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the denial
of class certification based on the need for individualized
assessment of whether “each putative class member relied upon
false representations or failures to disclose”); Peters v. Jim
Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 220 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2000)
(requiring a showing of proximate causation and adopting a
four-prong reliance test for establishing actual damages); Bizier
v. Globe Fin. Servs., Inc., 654 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting
in dicta the need to show causation for an award of actual
damages “in addition to a threshold showing of a violation of a
TILA requirement”).
     See e.g., Warburton v. Foxtons, Inc., No. 04-2474, 2005 WL6
1398512, at *9–10 (D.N.J. June 13, 2005); Nevarez v. O’Connor
Chevrolet, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 927, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2004); In re
Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc., 161 F.
Supp. 2d 362 (D.N.J. 2001); Anderson v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc.,
9 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Brister v. All Star
Chevrolet, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (E.D. La. 1997);
Barlow v. Evans, 992 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 1997);
Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan, 955 F. Supp. 938, 943 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Wiley v. Earl’s Pawn & Jewelry, Inc., 950 F. Supp.
1108, 1114–15 (S.D. Ala. 1997); Adiel v. Chase Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 630 F. Supp. 131, 133–35 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d,
810 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1987); McCoy v. Salem Mortgage Co.,
8
74 F.R.D. 8, 12–13 (E.D. Mich. 1976).  But see Lopez v. Orlor,
176 F.R.D. 35, 40 (D. Conn. 1997) (granting class certification
and rejecting the argument that TILA plaintiffs cannot recover
actual damages unless they could have gotten more favorable
terms elsewhere); Sutliff v. County Sav. & Loan Co., 533 F.
Supp. 1307, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (measuring actual damages
to be the difference between the improperly increased interest
rate and the original interest rate); In re Russell, 72 B.R. 855,
857 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (concluding that actual damages are
available for “substantial” TILA violations without the need to
prove detrimental reliance).
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concedes the great weight of authority favors the detrimental
reliance standard.  Accordingly, the core theme underlying
Vallies’s numerous arguments is that the weight of authority is
wrong.  In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the District
Court rejected Vallies’s challenges, correctly holding that a
showing of detrimental reliance is necessary to recover actual
damages for TILA disclosure violations.
A.
The Truth in Lending Act provides a range of remedies
to achieve its goals.  First, it authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission as its overall enforcement agency, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1607(c), and provides other federal agencies with enforcement
power over certain categories of lenders, 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a).
The enforcement agencies are authorized to remediate unlawful
finance charges by requiring adjustments of consumers’
10
accounts.  15 U.S.C. § 1607(e)(1).  Second, TILA imposes
criminal liability for knowing and willful violations.  15 U.S.C.
§ 1611.  Finally, TILA creates a private cause of action for
actual damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1), and also for statutory
damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2).  For class action suits arising
out of the same TILA violation, Congress capped the recovery
of statutory damages to the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the
defendant’s net worth.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B).  As the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed, “[u]nder this
regime, statutory damages provide at least a partial remedy for
all material TILA violations; however, actual damages ensure
that consumers who have suffered actual harm due to a lender’s
faulty disclosures can be fully compensated . . . .”  Turner v.
Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).  As noted, the parties here settled the statutory damage
claims under § 1640(a)(2) for the maximum statutory amount,
and the putative class is now seeking actual damages under
§ 1640(a)(1).
“[E]very exercise of statutory interpretation begins with
an examination of the plain language of the statute.”  Rosenberg
v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001).  The statute
here provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor
who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
this part, including any requirement under section 1635
of this title, subsection (f) or (g) of section 1641 of this
title, or part D or E of this subchapter with respect to any
11
person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the
sum of —
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as
a result of the failure;
(2)
(A) (i) in the case of an individual action
twice the amount of any finance charge in
connection with the transaction, (ii) in the
case of an individual action relating to a
consumer lease under part E of this
subchapter, 25 per centum of the total
amount of monthly payments under the
lease, except that the liability under this
subparagraph shall not be less than $100
nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in the case
of an individual action relating to a credit
transaction not under an open end credit
plan that is secured by real property or a
dwelling, not less than $400 or greater
than $4,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such
amount as the court may allow, except that
as to each member of the class no
minimum recovery shall be applicable, and
the total recovery under this subparagraph
in any class action or series of class actions
arising out of the same failure to comply
by the same creditor shall not be more than
12
the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of
the net worth of the creditor; 
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce
the foregoing liability or in any action in which a
person is determined to have a right of rescission
under section 1635 of this title, the costs of the
action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as
determined by the court; and 
(4) in the case of a failure to comply with any
requirement under section 1639 of this title, an
amount equal to the sum of all finance charges
and fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor
demonstrates that the failure to comply is not
material.
In determining the amount of award in any class action,
the court shall consider, among other relevant factors, the
amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency
and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
the resources of the creditor, the number of persons
adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor’s
failure of compliance was intentional. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).  The Act, therefore, provides for different
forms of compensatory damages—actual damages under
§ 1640(a)(1), and statutory damages for individuals under
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) and for class actions under § 1640(a)(2)(B).
Actual damages are treated differently from statutory damages
and have their own definition.  The definition of the term “actual
     See generally Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. & John L. Ropiequet,7
Actual Damages Under the TILA:  Collapsing Class Actions, 55
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damages” is “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to
compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay
actual losses.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 445 (9th ed. 2009).
Coupled with the phrase “sustained by such person as a result of
the failure,” the statute “links the loss to the failure to disclose.”
Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 436
(5th Cir. 2000); see also Peters v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co.,
220 F.3d 915, 916–17 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying the traditional
definition of the term “actual damages” to require that plaintiff
proves an injury or loss).  The plain meaning of § 1640(a)
requires causation to recover actual damages.  In the context of
TILA disclosure violations, a creditor’s failure to properly
disclose must cause actual damages; that is, without detrimental
reliance on faulty disclosures (or no disclosure), there is no loss
(or actual damage).  See, e.g., Gold Country Lenders v. Smith (In
re Smith), 289 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing dictionary
definition of “actual damages” to conclude that a borrower must
establish detrimental reliance); Turner, 242 F.3d at 1028
(finding that the statute’s language indicates drafters’ intention
that plaintiffs must demonstrate detrimental reliance to recover
actual damages).
Some commentators have noted that under a detrimental
reliance standard, actual damages for TILA disclosure violations
may be difficult to prove.   Furthermore, detrimental reliance7
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 200, 206 (Spring-Fall, 2001),
reprinted in Truth in Lending, 2008 Supplement 469 (Alvin C.
Harrell ed. 2008); Ralph J. Rohner & Fred H. Miller, Truth in
Lending 805 (2000).
     The view of the government enforcement agencies charged8
with enforcing TILA, cited by Vallies, does not assist in
14
may create obstacles for class certification because of the
individualized fact-specific nature of the reliance inquiry.  See,
e.g., Perrone, 232 F.3d at 440 (denying class certification
“[s]ince individual reliance is necessary to prove actual
damages”); see generally Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 7.
But the requirements of proving actual damages are dictated by
TILA’s remedial structure.  By providing for statutory and
actual damages, the statute achieves its dual purpose of
deterrence and compensation.  The compensatory remedy of
actual damages is permitted only in cases where the violation
caused harm—where harm was “sustained by [the consumer] as
a result of” the violation.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1).  Without
detrimental reliance, only statutory damages are available.
B.
Because the statutory language of § 1640(a) is
unambiguous we need not look to legislative history to ascertain
the meaning of the statute.  Nonetheless, the legislative history
of TILA provides support for the necessity to establish
detrimental reliance to recover actual damages:8
interpreting § 1640(a) because the Joint Notice of Statement of
Enforcement Policy, 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (Jan. 4, 1979), deals
solely with the regulatory enforcement provision under § 1607.
     The legislative history cited refers to the Truth in Lending9
Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (Sept.
30, 1995).  Congress was then contemplating increasing caps on
statutory damages and creating different remedies for disclosure
violations involving real property loans.  This legislative history
is relevant because at the time Congress necessarily considered
the meaning of the then-existing remedies.  Barnes v. Cohen,
749 F.2d 1009, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[S]tatements as to
legislative intent made by legislators subsequent to the
enactment of a statute are . . . entitled to consideration as an
expert opinion concerning [the statute’s] proper interpretation.”
15
Section 130(a) of TILA allows a consumer to recover
both actual and statutory damages in connection with
TILA violations.  However, statutory damages are
provided in TILA because actual damages, which require
proof that the borrower suffered a loss in reliance upon
the inaccurate disclosure, are extremely difficult to
establish.  To recover actual damages, consumers must
show that they suffered a loss because they relied on an
inaccurate or incomplete disclosure.
141 Cong. Rec. 26567, 26576 (1995) (statement of Rep.
McCollum, co-author of legislation);  see also H.R. Rep. No.9
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
     See also Adiel v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 630 F.10
Supp. 131, 134 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (noting the difficulty of
establishing causation for actual damages was “the very impetus
behind the legislative decision to construct a workable scheme
of statutory damages”); McCoy v. Salem Mortgage Co., 74
F.R.D. 8, 12 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (“[I]t seems likely that if actual
damages could be computed by a simple formula, no statutory
damage provision would have been necessary.”).
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104-193, at 99 (1995) (“To recover actual damages, consumers
must show that they suffered a loss because they relied on an
inaccurate or incomplete disclosure.”).  Statutory damages
provide a compensatory remedy for TILA violations and also
effectuate TILA’s deterrence objectives.  Actual damages
compensate those consumers who have suffered actual harm
because of the violations.  Statutory damages “are provided in
TILA because actual damages, which require proof that the
[consumer] suffered a loss in reliance upon the inaccurate
disclosure, are extremely difficult to establish.”  141 Cong. Rec.
26758, 26898 (1995) (statement of Sen. Mack).   TILA’s10
legislative history supports our conclusion that a showing of
detrimental reliance is required to recover actual damages for
TILA disclosure violations.
     The said clause of § 1640(a) states:11
In determining the amount of award in any class action,
the court shall consider, among other relevant factors, the
amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency
and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
the resources of the creditor, the number of persons
17
C.
Vallies contends the reliance requirement is incompatible
with other provisions in TILA, such as § 1607(e)(2)(d) that
exempts remediation of finance charges where technical
violations “have not misled or otherwise deceived the
consumer.”  15 U.S.C. § 1607(e)(2)(d).  The absence of similar
language in § 1640(a)(1), Vallies contends, demonstrates lack of
Congressional intent to impose a reliance requirement on actual
damages claims.  But this ignores the fact that proof of “actual
damages” under § 1640(a)(1) requires a showing of causation
and actual loss.  Congress’s failure to include the above-quoted
language in § 1640(a)(1) does not support a reasonable
inference that it did not intend the detrimental reliance
requirement.
Vallies also argues the detrimental reliance requirement
conflicts with other language in § 1640.  We disagree.  It does
not conflict with the clause in § 1640(a), instructing the courts
to consider “the amount of any actual damages awarded” when
setting statutory damages in a class action.  15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a).   The statute creates no presumption that actual11
adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor’s
failure of compliance was intentional.
     Section 1640(g) states:12
The multiple failure to disclose to any person any
information required under this part or part D or E of this
subchapter to be disclosed in connection with a single
account under an open end consumer credit plan, other
single consumer credit sale, consumer loan, consumer
lease, or other extension of consumer credit, shall entitle
the person to a single recovery under this section but
continued failure to disclose after a recovery has been
granted shall give rise to rights to additional recoveries.
This subsection does not bar any remedy permitted by
section 1635 of this title. 
18
damages will be awarded—courts must consider actual damages
if they are awarded.  See Perrone, 232 F.3d 439 n.6 (“There is
no logical connection between this statement [in § 1640(a)] and
the separate question of what formula to apply for measuring
actual damages.”).
Likewise, the detrimental reliance requirement does not
conflict with § 1640(g), which provides consumers additional
recoveries for post-judgment TILA violations.  15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(g).   Vallies’s assertion that it is not possible for a12
consumer to rely on post-recovery TILA violations is incorrect.
For example, a consumer, who previously recovered for harm
19
caused by inaccurate bank statements, could rely on later
inaccuracies, believing that a creditor had corrected the
violation.  Moreover, § 1640(g) does not distinguish between
actual damages and statutory damages.  Thus, additional
recoveries in the form of statutory damages might be available
under § 1640(g) even where detrimental reliance cannot be
proven.
Contrary to Vallies’s arguments, the Regulatory
Enforcement provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1607, and the Correction of
Errors provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b), do not identify a test for
recovery of actual damages resulting from TILA disclosure
violations.  The Regulatory Enforcement provision authorizes
relevant enforcement agencies to require creditors to adjust
borrower accounts to remedy disclosure violations.  But this
grant of authority to seek restitutionary damages does not mean
the same authority is given to private litigants.  Furthermore, a
creditor’s liability is limited not only by regulatory discretion,
but also by the statute itself in circumstances where the
adjustment “would have a significantly adverse impact upon the
safety or soundness of the creditor.”  15 U.S.C. § 1607(e)(3)(A).
No such limitation exists for private litigants under § 1640.
Accordingly, the authority provided to the enforcing agencies
under § 1607 cannot be equated with the rights of private
litigants under § 1640.
Nor are there conflicts with the Correction of Errors
provision.  Section 1640(b) provides creditors with a safe harbor
from liability for TILA disclosure violations when creditors
     Section 1640(b) states:13
A creditor or assignee has no liability under this section
or section 1607 of this title or section 1611 of this title
for any failure to comply with any requirement imposed
under this part or part E of this subchapter, if within sixty
days after discovering an error, whether pursuant to a
final written examination report or notice issued under
section 1607 (e)(1) of this title or through the creditor’s
or assignee’s own procedures, and prior to the institution
of an action under this section or the receipt of written
notice of the error from the obligor, the creditor or
assignee notifies the person concerned of the error and
makes whatever adjustments in the appropriate account
are necessary to assure that the person will not be
required to pay an amount in excess of the charge
actually disclosed, or the dollar equivalent of the annual
percentage rate actually disclosed, whichever is lower. 
20
choose to make adjustments to borrower accounts “to assure that
the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of the
charge actually disclosed, or the dollar equivalent of the annual
percentage rate actually disclosed, whichever is lower.”  15
U.S.C.  § 1640(b).   While this provision explicitly establishes13
a formula for account adjustments the creditors must make to
avail themselves of safe-harbor protections, it does not turn
actual damages into a restitution remedy.  The Correction of
Errors provision is not mandatory.  It provides a shield from
liability for disclosure violations to creditors who choose to
21
correct them.  Section 1640(b) shields creditors from both civil
liability and regulatory enforcement.  Accordingly, contrary to
Vallies’s arguments, the provision provides creditors an
economic incentive to self-correct disclosure violations, even
where actual damages might not be recoverable, because the
enforcement agencies have authority under TILA to seek
restitutionary adjustments.  15 U.S.C. § 1607(e).
D.
Vallies’s search for support in other statutes is unavailing
because those statutes address different subject matters.  The
provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f, which prohibits credit discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age, do not conflict with the detrimental reliance
requirement.  Section 1691e(a) provides that “[a]ny creditor who
fails to comply with any requirement imposed under [ECOA]
shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for any actual damages
sustained by such applicant.”  Although both ECOA’s
§ 1691e(a) and TILA’s § 1640(a)(1) employ “any actual
damage” language, under ECOA, the measure of actual damages
is harm caused by creditors’ unlawful discriminatory behavior.
Similarly, the civil liability provisions of the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r, do not
conflict with requiring a showing of detrimental reliance to
recover actual damages for TILA disclosure violations.  EFTA
employs the same language as § 1640(a)(1) to define liability for
     Section 1693b(d)(3) states:14
(A) In general
The regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall
require any automated teller machine operator who
imposes a fee on any consumer for providing host
transfer services to such consumer to provide notice in
accordance with subparagraph (B) to the consumer (at
the time the service is provided) of— 
(i) the fact that a fee is imposed by such operator
for providing the service; and 
(ii) the amount of any such fee. 
(B) Notice requirements 
(i) On the machine 
The notice required under clause (i) of
subparagraph (A) with respect to any fee
described in such subparagraph shall be posted in
a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the
automated teller machine at which the electronic
fund transfer is initiated by the consumer. 
(ii) On the screen 
The notice required under clauses (i) and (ii) of
subparagraph (A) with respect to any fee
described in such subparagraph shall appear on
the screen of the automated teller machine, or on
22
actual damages.  15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(1).  But actual damages
for violations of EFTA’s “notice” provisions, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693b(d)(3)(B),  which are analogous to violations of TILA14
a paper notice issued from such machine, after the
transaction is initiated and before the consumer is
irrevocably committed to completing the
transaction, except that during the period
beginning on November 12, 1999, and ending on
December 31, 2004, this clause shall not apply to
any automated teller machine that lacks the
technical capability to disclose the notice on the
screen or to issue a paper notice after the
transaction is initiated and before the consumer is
irrevocably committed to completing the
transaction. 
(C) Prohibition on fees not properly disclosed and
explicitly assumed by consumer
No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine
operator in connection with any electronic fund transfer
initiated by a consumer for which a notice is required
under subparagraph (A), unless— 
(i) the consumer receives such notice in
accordance with subparagraph (B); and
(ii) the consumer elects to continue in the manner
necessary to effect the transaction after receiving
such notice.
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disclosure provisions, require a showing of detrimental reliance.
See, e.g., Voeks v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., 560 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (“To show actual damages under
§ 1693m(a)(1) a plaintiff must plead and prove detrimental
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reliance.”); Martz v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. Civ A 06-1075, 2007
WL 2343800, at *7–8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2007) (referencing
cases requiring plaintiffs to establish causation of harm in the
form of detrimental reliance to recover actual damages for
violation of EFTA’s notice requirements); Brown v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 457 F. Supp. 2d 82, 90 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that
detrimental reliance is required to recover actual damages for
violation of EFTA’s notice requirements); Polo v. Goodings
Supermarkets, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 399, 408 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(accepting the contention that every potential class member must
prove detrimental reliance on erroneous fee postings to recover
actual damages under EFTA).  Vallies points to Savrnoch v.
First Am. Bankcard, Inc., No. 07-C-0241, 2007 WL 3171302
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007), where the court concluded reliance
was not required to obtain damages “for a violation of the
EFTA’s prohibition on fees not properly disclosed,
§ 1693b(d)(3)(C).” Id. at *3.  But Savrnoch explicitly agreed
“that the plain language of § 1693m(a)(1) requires that
[Plaintiff] show causation of harm through detrimental reliance
when a plaintiff claims a violation of the EFTA’s notice
provisions, § 1693b(d)(3)(B).”  Id.  It then drew a “distinction
between § 1693b(d)(3)(C), a statutory provision prohibiting the
imposition of fees, and § 1693b(d)(3)(B), a statutory provision
requiring proper notice,” id. at *3, concluding “detrimental
reliance is not needed to prove causation” for alleged violations
     This distinction, originally drawn by the same Magistrate15
Judge in Mayotte v. Associated Bank, N.A., No. 07-C-0033,
2007 WL 2358646 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 17, 2007) and Voeks v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-C-0030, 2007 WL 2358645 (E.D. Wis.
Aug. 17, 2007), has been rejected in Voeks v. Pilot Travel Ctrs.,
560 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Wis. 2008).  Because the claims here
are under TILA, and not EFTA, we make no judgment about
EFTA’s interpretation and express no opinion on whether the
distinction is appropriate.
     It appears Vallies did not raise the CEBA argument in the16
District Court, and it has therefore been waived.
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of § 1693b(d)(3)(C).  Id. at *4.   Because the distinction is15
inapplicable to TILA, Savrnoch is inapposite.
The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(“CEBA”), 12 U.S.C. § 3806, also does not conflict with the
detrimental reliance requirement.  CEBA does not define a
disclosure requirement.  It imposes a cap on the maximum
interest rate that may be applied to an adjustable rate mortgage
loan.  12 U.S.C. § 3806(a) (“Any adjustable rate mortgage loan
originated by a creditor shall include a limitation on the
maximum interest rate that may apply during the term of the
mortgage loan.”).  Although CEBA requires that its violations
be treated as TILA violations, 12 U.S.C. § 3806(c), it creates no
inconsistency with the detrimental reliance requirement.16
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Finally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Rule 10b-
5 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is inapposite
to our analysis here.  Proof of a material misrepresentation or
omission may be sufficient to recover actual damages for Rule
10b-5 violations.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
245–47 (1988); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 381–85
(1970).  But Rule 10b-5 cases are distinguishable because they
involve the unique role of securities markets.  “Because most
publicly available information is reflected in [the] market price,
an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action.”  Basic, 485 U.S. at 992; see also Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 174–77 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing when
a presumption of reliance is proper in securities litigation).  The
reliance presumption under Rule 10b-5, carved out specifically
for the unique nature of the securities markets, does not apply
here, and the District Court correctly refused to extend it to
§ 1640(a).
E.
There is also no inconsistency between the detrimental
reliance requirement and other TILA provisions that govern the
refund of prohibited prepayment penalties, 15 U.S.C. § 1615,
provide a borrower a right to rescind certain credit transactions
until all required material disclosures are delivered, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635, and prohibit a variety of credit charges for certain
mortgages, 15 U.S.C. § 1639.  That these TILA provisions
specifically provide for rescission and restitution-type remedies
     Notably, §§ 1615 and 1640 are unrelated because § 164017
defines civil liability for violations under Parts B, D, and E of
the statute, while § 1615 is within Part A.  Section 1635
provides the rescission remedy independently, explicitly, and in
addition to civil damages under § 1640.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(g)
(“[I]n addition to rescission the court may award relief under
section 1640 . . . for violations . . . not relating to the right to
rescind.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (defining civil liability for “any
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement [of TILA],
including any requirement under section 1635”).  Similarly,
damages for the violation of § 1639 are defined independently
and explicitly in § 1640 itself.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(4) (stating
that a creditor is liable “in the case of a failure to comply with
any requirement under section 1639 . . . [in] an amount equal to
the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the
consumer . . . .”).
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does not imply that detrimental reliance is not required to
recover actual damages for disclosure violations.17
We also reject Vallies’s attempt to distinguish the
violations claimed in this case from other disclosure violations
of TILA.  In his Amended Complaint, Vallies claimed that Sky
Bank failed to disclose payments for GAP insurance, and to
account for GAP coverage as a “finance charge.”  Therefore,
Vallies plainly alleged a disclosure violation of TILA.  Because
TILA includes finance charges in the definition of “material
disclosures,” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u), Vallies contends the recovery
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of actual damages for a “material” violation does not require a
showing of detrimental reliance.  But § 1640(a)(1) does not
reference “material disclosures” and does not provide for
distinct treatment of “material” violations for the purpose of
calculating actual damages.  Therefore, the definition of
“material disclosures” in § 1602(u) has no relevance to
§ 1640(a)(1).
The sole authority potentially providing support for
distinguishing between different categories of disclosure
violations is In re Russell, 72 B.R. 855 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
Russell articulated the test for actual damages as one where
there has been a “substantial violation” as opposed to a
“technical violation.”  Id. at 863 (“We believe that actual
damages arise whenever a disclosure statement contains a
substantial violation, as opposed to a mere technical violation,
and that damages should be measured by the magnitude of the
violation.”).  All courts since have rejected the Russell test.  See,
e.g., Perrone, 232 F.3d at 438 (“Such a test ‘marks a radical
departure from established Truth in Lending case law.’”
(quoting D. Edwin Schmelzer, Truth in Lending Developments
in 1987:  An Active Year on Several Fronts, 43 Bus. Law. 1041,
1067-68 (1988)); see also Ralph J. Rohner & Fred H. Miller,
Truth in Lending 806 n.101 (2000) (raising practical problems
with applying Russell and suggesting that if this decision is
emulated, it may radically alter the TILA balance by broadly
allowing reimbursement in a private action).  Russell erred in its
categorization of disclosure violations because nothing in the
     In Schnall, we analyzed TILA to interpret former § 4310 of18
the Truth in Savings Act (“TISA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–13,
which was closely modeled after TILA.  279 F.3d at 217.
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text of TILA supports judicial discretion in distinguishing
“substantial” from “technical” violations.  Similarly, nothing in
TILA would allow us to treat “material disclosure” violations
differently from violations of other TILA disclosure
requirements for purposes of recovery of actual damages under
§ 1640(a)(1).
F.
Vallies suggests the detrimental reliance requirement
conflicts with our opinions in Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales
Co., 593 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979), and Schnall v. Amboy Nat’l
Bank, 279 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2002).  In Dzadovsky, we stated that
a TILA violation is “presumed to injure a borrower by
frustrating” TILA’s purpose.  But Dzadovsky involved solely a
claim for statutory damages.  As noted, statutory damages do not
require detrimental reliance.
In Schnall, we stated that “the TILA jurisprudence
overwhelmingly rejects any reliance requirement.” Schnall, 279
F.3d at 219.   Again, Schnall involved solely statutory damages.18
In fact, we noted that “[t]o recover actual damages, however, a
plaintiff must obviously show that he suffered some financial
harm that he would not have suffered . . . .”  Id. at 219 n.10; see
also id. at 215 n.5 (“Reliance might be relevant . . . for purposes
     We note that the District Court supported its grant of19
summary judgment by reciting a four-prong test from the Eighth
Circuit: “a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) he read the TILA
disclosure statement; (2) he understood the charges being
disclosed; (3) had the disclosure statement been accurate, he
would have sought a lower price; and (4) he would have
obtained a lower price.’” Mem. Order at 10 (citing Peters, 220
F.3d at 917).  No doubt a plaintiff who can satisfy the Peters test
will successfully establish detrimental reliance.  Although Peters
has been influential in many courts, including those in our
circuit, e.g., Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d
362 (D.N.J. 2001), others have used different language.  For
accuracy-of-disclosure violations like the ones presented here,
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of determining actual (in contrast to statutory) damages.”).  In
sum, we have never rejected the requirement of detrimental
reliance to recover actual damages for TILA disclosure
violations.
III.
This case does not present an occasion to evaluate which
specific facts and circumstances constitute detrimental reliance
because Vallies does not contend that he relied on Sky Bank’s
disclosure violations.  Because we find that a showing of
detrimental reliance is required to recover actual damages for a
TILA disclosure violation, and Vallies neither pled nor made
such showing, the grant of summary judgment was proper on the
claim for actual damages.19
other courts have held that detrimental reliance can be shown
where plaintiffs can establish that they would have foregone the
loan completely had they received and reviewed an accurate
disclosure.  See, e.g., United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d
285, 297 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To establish detrimental reliance, the
debtor must demonstrate that he or she would either have
received a better interest rate for the loans elsewhere or would
have elected not to take the loan had the required information
been available.”); McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc. (In re
Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The consumer
must show that she ‘would either have secured a better interest
rate elsewhere, or foregone the loan completely.’” (quoting Gold
Country Lenders v. Smith (In re Smith), 289 F.3d at 1157));
Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 718 (6th Cir. 2000). 
Nevertheless, plaintiff here does not assert and cannot
prove he detrimentally relied.  This case does not present the
occasion to formulate factors that may constitute detrimental
reliance.
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